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1. Introduction 
Cost stickiness, also referred to as asymmetric cost behavior, is a well-documented result 
of managerial discretion underlying the development of corporate cost compared to changes in 
firm activity. Cost stickiness builds on the notion that costs, on average, decrease less during 
downturns in firm activity than they increase for equivalent hikes (Anderson et al., 2003). Driv-
ers of this behavior are manifold but can be summed up under three broad categories (Banker 
et al., 2017; Günther et al., 2014). First, managers trade-off adjustment cost of downsizing un-
der-utilized capacity with its respective holding costs. Generally, the higher the adjustment 
costs, for instance in the form of severance pay for dismissed employees, the lower the willing-
ness to reduce capacity. Second, if managers are optimistic about future business, they will most 
likely “sit out” the – presumably – short-term downturn to benefit disproportionally from future 
sales increases while the firms that downsized capacity incur additional cost to return to full 
capacity. Third, self-serving managers, with little oversight, might derive personal utility from 
empire-building. They will likely stall resource adjustments until the last possible moment to 
not admit value-destroying past investments in unnecessary capacity through, for instance, mer-
gers and acquisitions. While the former are based on business judgement, the latter motive is 
rather problematic (e.g., Brüggen and Zehnder, 2014). 
Cost stickiness research relies heavily on versions of a cross-sectional model established 
by Anderson et al. (2003), which are estimated over long time-series of 30 years and more 
(Banker et al., 2017). The method to estimate cost stickiness has not evolved much since, aside 
from the introduction of additional determinants for cost stickiness (for reviews of the literature, 
cf., Banker et al., 2017; Günther et al., 2014). Therefore, such as in the literature on value rele-
vance of accounting information (Hail, 2013) and earnings management (Srivastava, 2014), 
changing underlying economic conditions and firm characteristics might influence or even bias 
proxies for cost stickiness. While aforementioned examples refer to financial accounting re-
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search, much of the same caveats might also apply to cost accounting and management. Con-
ceptually, costs are a major component of accounting earnings (Banker and Byzalov, 2014). 
As such, the cost stickiness literature employs financial accounting data as a proxy for cost 
accounting data. Unsurprisingly, a line of literature exhibits the connection of financial account-
ing properties with cost stickiness, such as conservatism (Banker et al. 2016), zero earnings 
benchmark beating (Dierynck et al., 2012), meeting analyst earnings projections (Kama and 
Weiss, 2013) and income smoothing (Hartlieb and Loy, 2017). 
We build on the notion by Srivastava (2014) that each new listing cohort (i.e., firms initially 
listed on the stock exchange during a decade) changes the fundamentals underlying cross-sec-
tional samples. He conjectures his result, that earnings quality measures decline over successive 
listing cohorts, as, essentially, being a by-product of the U.S. economy’s shift towards more 
knowledge-based firms (even if they belong to the same industry as firms listed in an earlier 
cohort). Conceptually, listing cohorts cover a range of intertwined factors associated with, but 
not limited to, (1) increasing average risk of newer firms, which exhibit low profitability but 
high growth prospects (Fama and French, 2004), (2) are involved in more competitive product 
markets (Srivastava and Tse, 2016), (3) have to hold more cash and lower inventories to create 
a buffer for increased R&D expenses, which are inherently riskier than capital expenditures 
(Bates et al., 2009), (4) different earnings and balance sheet properties between seasoned and 
newly listed firms (for instance, widening book-to-market ratios (e.g., Givoly and Hayn, 2000), 
as newly listed firms put more emphasis on intangible capital), (5) differences in executive 
compensation contracts which follow “fashions” across the decades (Murphy, 2013), and pos-
sibly also (6) effects of firms’ life cycles as younger cohorts most likely consist of firms in 
earlier life cycle phases while firms in older listing cohorts mature. Related to cost accounting, 
prior evidence shows that increased investment in intangible capital in the form of, for instance, 
research & development (R&D), human capital (e.g., specialist employees, training) and adver-
tising contributes to managers not cutting costs during downturns. This is attributable to the 
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fear of deteriorating firm-specific intangible resources and capabilities if the level of investment 
is not kept at least constant (Venieris et al., 2015). If firms successively become more 
knowledge-intensive, this should increase average cost stickiness over the listing cohorts. 
Replicating Anderson et al. (2003)’s basic cost stickiness model, which exhibits that sell-
ing, general, and administrative (SGA) costs increase (decrease) by 0.55% (0.35%) per 1% 
growth (decline) in sales, we find an interesting pattern. While the increase in SGA costs, fol-
lowing a 1% sales increase, fluctuates around a mean value of 0.68%1 across listing cohorts, 
the corresponding cost decreases decline from 0.56% (for seasoned firms) to 0.30% (for the 
2000s listing cohort).2 As such, we find evidence that cost stickiness, in fact, does increase with 
each successive listing cohort. 
One symptom of a possible and profound change in the properties of cost stickiness over 
time is the case of employee intensity. While much of the earlier research finds a positive asso-
ciation of employee intensity and the degree of cost stickiness (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003), the 
sign reverses in more contemporaneous papers (Chen et al., 2012; Dierynck et al., 2012; Hart-
lieb and Loy, 2017). A potential reason is the increased reliance on temporary labor in younger 
samples (Chen et al.,  2012). Temporary labor is typically associated with relatively low ad-
justment cost. Over our sample period, the number of temporary workers in the United States 
increased more than tenfold, with the far overwhelming increase taking place from 1990 on-
wards (e.g., Segal and Sullivan, 1997; U.S. Department of Commerce, 2015). 
In summary, we exhibit (1) that each new listing cohort, on average, invests more in intan-
gible capital3 through sales, general and administrative (SGA) and R&D expenses, (2) that each 
new listing cohort exhibits more cost stickiness, as proxied by a range of cost categories, and 
                                                          
1 We attribute the higher value for cost increases to our longer sample period which ends in 2014, as compared to 
1998 for Anderson et al. (2003)‘s original contribution. 
2 Refer to Table 7 for additional results. 
3 We refer to the intangible asset definition by Lev et al. (2009) which builds on four concepts (p. 276): (1) Dis-
covery/learning intangibles, largely attributable to R&D; (2) Customer-related intangibles, related to brands, 
trademarks, distribution channels and advertising expenses; (3) Human-resource intangibles, associated with spe-
cialist employees, training, and compensation systems; and (4) Organization capital, which refers to unique busi-
ness processes and corporate cultures allowing the firm to create abnormal profits. 
5 
(3) that this development seems to be (partly) mitigated by increased reliance on temporary 
labor by younger listing cohort firms. Our additional results show that future cross-sectional 
cost stickiness research might benefit from the use of listing cohort-specific slope estimates for 
cost stickiness. Beyond these methodological adjustments, a new research agenda involving 
underlying changes of aforementioned motives for cost stickiness seems warranted. Besides 
well-documented industry-effects (e.g., Subramaniam and Weidenmier Watson, 2016), we 
show that the appropriate peer-group, researchers as well as practitioners (e.g., for executive 
compensation contracts) should use, seems to be a combination of industry and listing-cohort. 
2. Data and Specifications 
We use data from the Compustat NA universe from 1970 through 2014. After excluding 
Fama-French industries identified by numbers 44-47 (finance firms) and 484 (almost nothing), 
our initial sample comprises 267,827 observations. Then, we drop observations with missing 
values for the respective cost categories or sales revenues in the current and/or preceding year 
and observations for which costs exceed sales revenues. Finally, we trim the top and bottom 0.5 
percent of changes in sales revenues and costs and exclude observations with missing values 
for our control variables. Following Srivastava (2014), we divide the remaining firms into five 
listing cohorts. The first year with available data in Compustat represents the firm’s listing year. 
Firms with a listing year before 1970 are classified as seasoned firms, the others are classified 
as new firms. These firms are further divided into four listing waves for each decade (with the 
2000s cohort ending in 2014). 
Table 1 documents the economic magnitude of the (de-)listing phenomenon for our initial 
firm population. In 1970, our sample consists of 1,770 firms. This number increases to a peak 
of 9,494 firms in 1996 and, thereafter, decreases to 4,238 firms in 2014. By definition, there are 
                                                          
4 The Fama-French industry 48 is a compound item for firms which are not included in one of the other 47 cate-
gories. More specifically, these include firms providing sanitary services, steam and air conditioning supplies, 
irrigation systems and cogeneration power producers. 
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only seasoned firms in 1970. However, at the end of our sample period, the proportion of sea-
soned firms only amounts to 11.6%. Thus, the dominant firm-population segment changed from 
the seasoned-firm segment to the new-firm segment over our sample period. The listing rate 
(i.e., compound annual growth rate of listings) ranges from 44% (1970s wave) to 10% (2000s 
wave). Delisting is also a very common phenomenon. Seasoned firms most likely prevail but 
still exhibit a delisting rate of 71.1%. For the other listing cohorts, the delisting rate even ranges 
from 79% to 87.4%. Hence, these descriptive results indicate that the (de-)listing phenomenon 
potentially plays an important role in the composition of samples employed in the cross-sec-
tional cost stickiness literature. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
We present the industry distribution for each listing cohort of our initial sample in Table 2. 
We find that manufacturing is the most highly represented industry with respect to seasoned 
firms, whereas the new-firm segment rather contains firms from the healthcare and business 
equipment industries. This indicates that the listing cohorts partly capture effects of changes in 
the industry composition of samples underlying prior cost stickiness research. However, we 
find significant within-industry (de-)listing activities across all industries. This implies that list-
ing cohort effects go beyond mere industry effects.5 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Depending on the respective cost category, the final sample ranges from 112,613 to 
172,931 firm-year observations (Table 3). The sample is skewed towards the earlier listing co-
horts. This is not surprising, as seasoned firms have a considerably longer time-series of yearly 
observations to contribute to the sample than, for instance, firms in the 2000s listing wave. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
                                                          
5  We test this by considering the descriptive results presented in Table 1 for each industry, separately. As an 
example, we exhibit the results for the manufacturing industry in Appendix B. 
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To test our research question whether new listing cohorts decisively change cross-sectional 
proxies for cost stickiness, we employ a standard cost stickiness model (Model (1)) in the spirit 
of Anderson et al. (2003) which includes economic controls for asset and employee intensity 
as well as successive sales decreases (Banker et al., 2014).6 
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Subscripts $ () reflect firm (time) indices, respectively. _	
, denotes the cost 
category employed in the respective regression: (1) SGA expenses, (2) costs of goods sold 
(COGS) as well as (3) core expenses (i.e., the sum of SGA costs and COGS), (4) noncore ex-
penses, and (5) operating costs (OC). Prior literature finds cost stickiness for a range of cost 
categories, depending on the setting and the industry under consideration (for a review, cf., 
Günther et al. 2014). 

	
_, proxies for periods of negative changes in firm ac-
tivity.7 In line with the literature on cross-sectional cost stickiness, we employ ratios and log-
specifications. On the one hand, it enhances comparability and moderates heteroscedasticity. 
On the other hand, it enables easier interpretation of regression coefficients as percentages (An-
derson et al., 2003).  measures the increase in costs for each percent of sales increase. The 
sum of  and  jointly proxies for the average cost decrease for each percent of declining 
sales. As such, a significantly negative  coefficient represents cost stickiness. 
                                                          
6  Industry- and year-fixed effects control for unobserved factors. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm-
level, control for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
7  All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. 
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3. Results 
Initial descriptive results 
Table 4 presents first revealing insights. The listing cohorts differ considerably in terms of 
cost intensities computed on a wave-year basis. While the seasoned firms’ COGS still outweigh 
SGA costs8 by a large margin, the relationship gradually shifts towards intangible investments 
in various forms of intangible and organizational capital. Probably the most accurate indicator 
of more knowledge-based firms entering the sample might be R&D intensity which increases 
from each listing cohort to the other. While earlier sample years (i.e., prior to 1975) were not 
subject to SFAS 2, which requires immediate expensing of R&D outlays, the values for R&D 
intensity for the first two cohorts might be (slightly) understated.9 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
  With the average firm in a listing cohort becoming more knowledge-intensive compared 
to its prior cohort peers, we expect cost stickiness to increase from one listing wave to the next. 
Knowledge intensive firms perceive prior periods’ investment in intangible and organizational 
capital as the basis of their capabilities and resources which might deteriorate when the level of 
investment is contemporaneously cut (Venieris et al., 2015). 
Multivariate results 
As previously predicted, we find that stickiness increases for a range of cost categories, 
most notably for SGA costs, core expenses and OC, in samples populated by gradually younger 
listing cohorts (Table 5). 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
                                                          
8  SGA cost include all costs related to the running the operations, with the exception of production (e.g., spending 
on advertising, training, business travel and sales commissions). 
9  Even for the seasoned and 1970s cohorts the effect should be minimal since at most, for a firm already listed 
in 1970, five firm-year observations are pre-SFAS 2. The only exception to the immediate expensing of R&D 
outlays are selective development costs for in-house software, following SOP98-1 (AICPA, 1998). This should 
– if at all – work against finding an increase in R&D intensity. 
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While the increase coefficient () remains largely stable across all cost categories, the 
decrease coefficient () becomes more negative until the 1990s listing cohort and subsequently 
increases back to the 1980s value for the 2000s listing cohort for SGA costs. While cost stick-
iness is less pronounced for COGS in the first place, which is in line with much of the literature, 
we observe a consistent increase in cost stickiness for core expenses (i.e., the sum of SGA costs 
and COGS) and operating costs (OC). The results for noncore expenses are less consistent with 
the previously observed pattern across listing cohorts. One reason for this might be that noncore 
expenses include other components besides knowledge-increasing R&D expenses (e.g., audit 
and legal fees, restructuring expenses etc.), which presumably are equally relevant for firms in 
older listing cohorts as they are, to some extent, mandatory as a result of (financial) regulation. 
Summing up, on average, we observe increasing cost stickiness from one listing cohort to the 
next across a range of cost categories, which the literature on cost stickiness discusses in dif-
ferent settings and industries (Günther et al., 2014). 
In terms of economic controls, we observe that the three-way-interactions for asset inten-
sity and successive decreases do not change significantly across listing cohorts (untabulated). 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
  Yet, we observe interesting patterns for employee intensity (Table 6). Whereas increased 
employee intensity contributes to significantly more cost stickiness in older listing cohorts for 
most of our cost categories (i.e., namely COGS and OC), the association reverses for younger 
cohorts (i.e., namely core expenses and OC). It has to be noted that also seasoned firms can 
benefit from more flexibility through temporary labor in later sample years, but the final two 
cohorts benefit from a fully developed and growing temporary labor force (Segal and Sullivan, 
1997; U.S. Department of Commerce, 2015), which decreases adjustment costs, over their full 
time series. Nevertheless, it might also be the case that older listing cohorts have different un-
derlying structures impairing adjustments (e.g., higher unionization rates in the manufacturing 
industry which dominates the seasoned firms and also presents a large fraction of the 1970s 
10 
listing wave, cf. Table 2) or incentives not to adjust labor in periods of declining activity (e.g., 
attributable to differences in executive compensation contracts which also seem to follow “fash-
ions” across the decades; Murphy, 2013). In combination, our results provide insights into the 
controversial results regarding the incremental effect of employee intensity, too. While earlier 
papers find a positive association of employee intensity with cost stickiness (e.g., Anderson et 
al., 2003), the association becomes negative in contemporaneous papers (Chen et al., 2012; 
Dierynck et al., 2012; Hartlieb and Loy, 2017). We will revisit this issue in the following 
section. 
4. Additional Tests 
Basic Cost Stickiness Model 
In our empirical model, we include year- and industry-fixed effects and control for several 
important influencing factors of asymmetric cost behavior (i.e., employee intensity, asset inten-
sity and a control for successive sales decreases). However, attributable to higher-order inter-
action effects, this makes it difficult to interpret the coefficients as percentage changes in rela-
tion to corresponding percentage changes in costs and sales. Therefore, we additionally repeat 
our analysis employing a basic (sparse) ABJ-model (i.e., without additional controls (Model 
(2)), which reads: ∆ ln _ , =   + ∆ ln 	
, + _ , × ∆ ln 	
, + . ,) for 
each listing cohort. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
The results, presented in Table 7, are generally in line with our main model. Almost all 
coefficients are significant, and we find that the degree of cost asymmetry increases for com-
mon cost categories such as SGA costs or OC over the successive listing cohorts. For instance, 
SGA costs (OC) increase by .707 (.957) percent per one percent increase in sales and decrease 
by .707 - .145 = .562 (.957 - .035 = .923) percent per one percent decrease in sales revenue for 
the seasoned firms. The coefficient  increases for younger listing cohorts, implying greater 
cost stickiness, while the cost increase coefficient  remains stable. As such, for the 2000s 
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listing wave, a one percent increase in sales is associated with a .640 (.916) increase in SGA 
costs (OC) while the corresponding decrease is only associated with a SGA costs (OC) decrease 
of .640 - .343 = .297 (.916 - .168 = .748). Thus, this development is not only statistically but 
also economically meaningful. 
Simultaneous control for industry- and time-variation in cost stickiness estimates across 
listing cohorts 
Our results suggest that the degree of cost stickiness varies across listing cohorts. To ad-
dress concerns that this effect is merely driven by time- and/or industry-variation underlying 
the listing cohorts (as presented in Table 1), we adjust our model. We again consider the basic 
ABJ-model and include a listing cohort trend-variable (ℎ), ranging from 1 (seasoned 
firms) through 5 (2000s wave), or an indicator variable that is coded as 1 for new firms and 
zero for seasoned ones (3
4), respectively. Additionally, we include year- and industry-fixed 
effects. Then, we interact all three (i.e., cohort-, time- and industry-) controls with ∆ ln 	
, 
and _ , × ∆ ln 	
 ,, to allow for specific slope coefficients for cost stickiness. Conse-
quently, the model (Model (3)) reads: 
∆ ln _ , =   + ∆ ln 	
, + _ , × ∆ ln 	
, + . ,  , 
with  = , + ∑ ,6 × ℎ(3
4)9 + ∑ ,: × ;
	 + ∑ ,< × "#,= , 
and  = , + ∑ ,6 × ℎ(3
4)9 + ∑ ,: × ;
	 + ∑ ,< × "#,=.   (3) 
This simultaneously controls for the time-, industry- and cohort-specific effects on cost-
stickiness estimates () rather than just including year- and industry-specific intercepts, as 
presented in the main results (and in line with extant cost stickiness research). 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Table 8 shows the results. For parsimony, we only report the pertinent coefficients and only 
refer to the SGA cost category, since it is most commonly used in cost stickiness research (e.g., 
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Anderson et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2002).10 Integrating the indicator variable 3
4 (Column 1), 
we find that the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant at the 0.01 level 
(t=-4.29). Hence, even if we also control for industry- or time-variation in slopes, we find that 
new firms exhibit significantly more cost stickiness than seasoned firms. Using the ℎ 
trend (Column 2) supports this result. For the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s wave, the coefficient is 
significantly negative and increasing, indicating that these firms are stickier than their counter-
parts from former cohorts. In summary, these additional results corroborate that listing cohorts 
have an effect on cost stickiness that goes beyond regular time- or industry-effects. 
Mediation analysis 
So far, our results indicate that listing cohorts have an effect on cost behavior but we can 
rather speculate about the channels through which listing cohorts impact cost stickiness, besides 
mentions of presumably higher reliance on temporary labor in younger samples (e.g., Chen et 
al., 2012). Therefore, we additionally conduct a mediation analysis to investigate potential 
channels. More precisely, we examine the effect of knowledge intensity, measured by R&D 
expenses, and temporary labor, proxied by employee intensity. We partition the sample using a 
median split for both variables and re-run the basic (sparse) ABJ-model (Model (3)) with an 
additional interaction term with the listing cohort dummy 3
4 and after controlling for indus-
try- or time-variations in cost stickiness slope coefficients. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
In Table 9 (Column 1), we present our regression model for all firms with knowledge in-
tensity below (or equal to) the sample median.11 The coefficient of our three-way interaction 
term of interest is negative and significant (t=-2.20), which again supports our notion that new 
                                                          
10 Employing OC, COGS and core expenses as our cost category does not alter the presented conclusions. Only 
for noncore expenses the results are generally insignificant and not in line with the expectations. We presume that 
this is in line with the multivariate results presented above (Table 5). Noncore expenses include many components 
unrelated to increasing intangible capital (e.g., audit and legal fees, restructuring expenses etc.). 
11 In line with extant literature in financial accounting (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006), we set R&D expenses to zero 
if the value is missing. This presumes that firms which, in fact, undertake material R&D activities also disclose 
related expenditures in their financial reports. This procedure results in a median of zero R&D expenses and une-
qual subsamples. 
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firms tend to be cost stickier than seasoned ones. For the high knowledge intensity subsample 
(Column 2), the coefficient is even more negative and highly significant. Comparing the sig-
nificant (t=2.32) difference between aforementioned coefficients implies that the effect of list-
ing cohorts on cost stickiness is particularly strong when firms exhibit high knowledge inten-
sity. Hence, knowledge intensity seems to mediate the effect of listing cohorts on cost behavior, 
potentially attributable to managers unwilling to run the risk of deteriorating past investment in 
intangible capital by reducing cost in periods of temporary downturns (Venieris et al., 2015).12 
For instance, attracting and developing key employees requires considerable investment. Thus, 
the reluctance to downsize the number of key employees, during – presumably – short-term 
downturns, is quite understandable. We find similar results for our temporary labor subsamples 
(Columns 3 and 4). The coefficient is larger for firms with above median employee intensity, 
as well. However, this difference is insignificant (t=1.14). Nevertheless, this result might be 
attributable to the fact that firms can exhibit high employee intensity from (non-)temporary 
labor, alike. Future research should develop better proxies for temporary labor and investigate 
the issue more closely. 
5. Conclusion 
The discussion whether fundamental changes in accounting standards or sample composi-
tion influence – or even bias – estimates in financial accounting research is already well estab-
lished (e.g., Hail, 2013; Srivastava, 2014). Our results provide evidence that this is also an issue 
in cost stickiness research. Employing the traditional cross-sectional model of cost stickiness, 
which includes controls for asset and employee intensity as well as successive periods of de-
creasing revenues (Anderson et al., 2003; Banker et al., 2014), we show that proxies for cost 
stickiness vary decisively across listing cohorts. It has to be noted that even firms from different 
                                                          
12 Alternatively, we also employ Tobin’s Q/the market-to-book (MTB) ratio as a proxy for knowledge intensity in 
our mediation analysis. While the coefficient for cost stickiness is slightly more negative for the above median 
MTB-subsample, the difference between the coefficients for both subsamples is highly insignificant (t = 0.14). 
Nonetheless, the MTB ratio proxies for much more than just knowledge intensity, such as, but not limited to, 
growth propects, accounting conservatism and underinvestment (e.g., Dybvig and Warachka, 2015). 
14 
listing cohorts largely operate under much of the same economic and legal conditions, and even 
belong to the same industries. Therefore, it seems to be a fruitful area of further research to 
explore the commonalities of firms belonging to the same listing cohort with respect to their 
cost behavior. Our results also suggest that researchers should employ additional controls for 
these underlying factors (e.g., through listing cohort-specific slope coefficients for cost sticki-
ness) to avoid spurious inferences of cost stickiness in cross-sectional samples. So far the liter-
ature did largely resort to include additional determinants of cost stickiness in the original cross-
sectional model by Anderson et al. (2003) (for reviews of the literature on determinants of cost 
stickiness, cf., Banker et al., 2017; Günther et al., 2014). 
As such, our results also call for a new, more fundamental research agenda with respect to 
cost stickiness. Researchers should take a look how the listing cohort-effect affects the three 
“classic” motives for cost stickiness. First, are there reasons to believe that managerial trade-
off decisions, involving adjustment cost of downsizing under-utilized capacity against their 
holding costs, changed substantively over time? Second, are managers successively becoming 
more optimistic about future business prospects? And, if so, why? Or, finally, is it plausible that 
managers of firms in younger listing cohorts, on average, exhibit more self-serving behavior 
than their peers at the helm of “more seasoned” firms? Cumulatively, we renew the call for 
research “explaining more complex structures for cost stickiness” (Günther et al., 2014, p. 314). 
While our results exhibit that some of the (changing) results in the cost stickiness literature are 
attributable to changes in the underlying sample of firms with each new listing cohort, and 
delistings of firms in older cohorts, we can only provide first indications on the causal relations. 
Along the lines mentioned above, researchers should more closely examine the underlying 
changes in business activities, managerial behavior and investment patterns. 
Our results are also meaningful to practitioners. While the regulatory playing field is 
largely level for all companies, with the potential exception of different unionization rates 
across industries or different labor laws across countries (e.g., Banker et al., 2013), it seems that 
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the potential – or willingness – to cut costs during downturns depends not only on well-docu-
mented industry-effects (e.g., Subramaniam and Weidenmier Watson, 2016) but also signifi-
cantly on the listing cohort peer-group. This is especially useful in composing executive com-
pensation contracts, screening competitors and investment targets. 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Cost Stickiness Model 
 	
 Annual sales revenue (sale). 
 

	
_ Indicator variable that equals 1 if sales (sale) of firm $ decrease be-
tween fiscal years  − 1 and  (	
, < 	
,), and 0 other-
wise. 
  !

_"#
#$ Employee intensity, calculated as the natural logarithm of the number 
of employees (emp) divided by sales (sale). 
 &
_"#
#$ Asset intensity, calculated as the natural logarithm of total current as-
sets (act) divided by sales (sale). 
 
$(
_

	
 Indicator variable that equals 1 if sales (sale) decrease in two consec-
utive years (	
 < 	
 < 	
), and 0 otherwise. 
Panel B: Cost Categories 
 SGA Selling, general, and administrative expenses (xsga). 
 COGS Cost of goods sold (cogs). 
 Core Expenses The sum of SGA and COGS. 
 Noncore Expenses Total expenses minus core expenses. 
 Operating Costs Sales revenue (sale) less income from operations (oiadp). 
 Total Expenses Sales revenue (sale) less income from before extraordinary items (ib). 
 R&D Research and development expenditures (xrd). 
 Cost Intensity The ratio of cost category to total expenses. 
Panel C: Additional Tests 
 ℎ Listing cohort trend variable coded 1 for seasoned firms, 2 for firms 
of the 1970s wave, 3 for the 1980s wave, 4 for the 1990s wave and 5 
for the 2000s wave, respectively. 
 3
4 Listing cohort indicator variable coded as 1 for firms of the new-firms 
(i.e., listed after 1970) segment, and 0 for the seasoned-firms segment. 
 KI Knowledge intensity indicator variable coded as 1 if the value for 
R&D expenses is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
 TL Temporary labor indicator variable coded as 1 if the value for em-
ployee intensity is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat mnemonics in parentheses. 
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Appendix B: Magnitude of (de-)listing for each listing cohort for the manufacturing in-
dustry 
 
Fiscal Year Total 
Number 
Seasoned 
Firms 
New Firms 
   1970s 
Wave 
1980s 
Wave 
1990s 
Wave 
2000s  
Wave 
1970 393 389 4    
1971 405 389 16    
1972 419 389 30    
1973 443 389 54    
1974 551 389 162    
1975 560 389 171    
1976 568 389 179    
1977 577 389 188    
1978 592 389 203    
1979 612 389 223    
1980 638 389 223 26   
1981 660 389 223 48   
1982 708 389 223 96   
1983 761 389 223 149   
1984 814 389 223 202   
1985 873 389 223 261   
1986 929 389 223 317   
1987 983 389 223 371   
1988 946 368 196 382   
1989 915 339 170 406   
1990 899 319 156 374 50  
1991 925 311 143 358 113  
1992 974 310 134 334 196  
1993 1,005 294 125 315 271  
1994 1,027 285 116 293 333  
1995 1,062 272 108 269 413  
1996 1,081 264 101 248 468  
1997 1,055 251 95 224 485  
1998 1,023 233 86 196 508  
1999 980 217 79 164 520  
2000 931 196 73 154 470 38 
2001 869 181 69 143 421 55 
2002 810 171 62 130 371 76 
2003 781 162 59 126 344 90 
2004 738 153 55 117 315 98 
2005 703 146 51 105 287 114 
2006 677 143 45 93 264 132 
2007 637 127 43 82 238 147 
2008 609 123 39 77 217 153 
20 
2009 598 121 38 70 206 163 
2010 572 115 37 64 189 167 
2011 567 114 37 61 177 177 
2012 542 111 37 52 167 175 
2013 504 106 35 49 158 156 
2014 377 95 21 39 121 101 
       
Proportion in 
2014 (pp) 
 
25.2 5.6 10.3 32.1 26.8 
Listing Rate (pp)   56.3 35.7 29.7 7.2 
Delisting Rate 
(pp) 
 72.8 84.3 87.9 69.6  
       
The table presents the number of firm-year observations from the listing cohorts in each year for the 
Fama/French 12 industry ‘Manufacturing’. The listing rate is calculated as the compound annual growth rate 
over the listing period (e.g., 1970–1979 for the 1970s wave). The delisting rate is calculated as 1 minus the 
percentage of firms that survived in 2014 from the last year of formation of that listing cohort (highlighted in 
bold font).  
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Table 1 
Magnitude of (de-)listing for each listing cohort 
Fiscal Year Total 
Number 
Seasoned 
Firms 
New Firms 
   1970s 
Wave 
1980s 
Wave 
1990s 
Wave 
2000s  
Wave 
1970 1,770 1,714 56    
1971 1,860 1,714 146    
1972 1,941 1,714 227    
1973 2,161 1,714 447    
1974 2,711 1,714 997    
1975 2,793 1,714 1,079    
1976 2,857 1,714 1,143    
1977 2,939 1,714 1,225    
1978 3,043 1,714 1,329    
1979 3,207 1,714 1,493    
1980 3,462 1,714 1,493 255   
1981 3,769 1,714 1,493 562   
1982 4,345 1,714 1,493 1,138   
1983 4,805 1,714 1,493 1,598   
1984 5,284 1,714 1,493 2,077   
1985 5,939 1,714 1,493 2,732   
1986 6,531 1,714 1,492 3,325   
1987 6,988 1,712 1,492 3,784   
1988 6,924 1,627 1,334 3,963   
1989 6,841 1,545 1,191 4,105   
1990 6,960 1,482 1,110 3,841 527  
1991 7,256 1,445 1,039 3,589 1,183  
1992 7,695 1,425 979 3,363 1,928  
1993 8,140 1,386 924 3,178 2,652  
1994 8,543 1,343 881 2,913 3,406  
1995 9,143 1,278 845 2,633 4,387  
1996 9,494 1,240 790 2,412 5,052  
1997 9,478 1,181 751 2,181 5,365  
1998 9,467 1,103 695 1,911 5,758  
1999 9,325 1,033 637 1,645 6,010  
2000 8,941 951 579 1,500 5,420 491 
2001 8,455 894 544 1,370 4,825 822 
2002 8,097 865 503 1,253 4,326 1,150 
2003 7,748 837 465 1,170 3,911 1,365 
2004 7,472 808 421 1,101 3,616 1,526 
2005 7,197 761 391 1,022 3,298 1,725 
2006 6,926 736 361 939 2,999 1,891 
2007 6,610 684 337 859 2,705 2,025 
22 
2008 6,339 657 322 798 2,457 2,105 
2009 6,207 640 317 750 2,255 2,245 
2010 6,079 623 301 700 2,071 2,384 
2011 6,157 601 291 651 1,901 2,713 
2012 6,014 581 274 596 1,754 2,809 
2013 5,676 562 259 560 1,638 2,657 
2014 4,238 495 187 431 1,265 1,860 
       
Proportion in 
2014 (pp) 
 
11.6 4.4 10.2 29.8 43.9 
Listing Rate (pp)   44.0 36.2 31.1 10.0 
Delisting Rate 
(pp) 
 71.1 87.4 89.5 79.0  
       
Table 1 presents the number of firm-year observations from the listing cohorts in each year. The listing rate is 
calculated as the compound annual growth rate over the listing period (e.g., 1970–1979 for the 1970s wave). 
The delisting rate is calculated as 1 minus the percentage of firms that survived in 2014 from the last year of 
formation of that listing cohort (highlighted in bold font). 
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Table 2 
Industry distribution by listing cohort 
Fama/French 12 
Industry Class. 
(in pp) 
Total 
Number 
Seasoned 
Firms 
New Firms 
   1970s 
Wave 
1980s 
Wave 
1990s 
Wave 
2000s  
Wave 
Consumer Non-
Durables 
5.96 9.35 5.89 5.21 4.76 4.25 
Consumer Dura-
bles 
2.80 4.87 2.81 2.39 1.96 1.85 
Manufacturing 12.43 21.74 14.19 9.58 9.05 6.63 
Oil, Gas and 
Coal 
5.72 4.50 5.35 7.04 4.44 9.33 
Chemicals 2.36 4.11 1.52 2.18 1.57 2.54 
Business 
Equipment 
19.89 9.22 18.28 20.28 27.52 21.04 
Telecommunica-
tion 
3.98 2.02 5.53 3.30 5.23 3.97 
Utilities 5.21 15.57 6.34 1.25 1.34 2.74 
Shops 12.94 13.94 14.88 14.38 11.67 8.59 
Healthcare 10.15 2.64 5,47 12.76 13.03 17.47 
Other 18.57 12.03 19.73 21.35 19.43 21.59 
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Table 3 
Final sample by cost category 
 Seasoned 
Firms 
1970s 
Wave 
1980s 
Wave 
1990s 
Wave 
2000s 
Wave 
 ∑   
SGA 39,474 23,860 33,480 36,633   8,455 141,902 
COGS 51,616 28,358 38,980 43,813 10,164 172,931 
Core Expenses 35,928 18,830 24,265 27,125   6,465 112,613 
Noncore Expenses 38,595 22,915 32,866 36,367   8,384 139,127 
Operating Costs 44,431 20,047 22,555 24,806   5,767 117,606 
Cost categories are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 4 
Cost intensities across listing cohorts 
 Seasoned 
Firms 
1970s 
Wave 
1980s 
Wave 
1990s 
Wave 
2000s 
Wave 
SGA Intensity 19.94 27.10 35.32 36.90 39.26 
COGS Intensity 68.09 63.79 56.38 54.03 33.50 
Core Expenses Intensity 88.03 90.89 91.70 90.94 72.76 
Noncore Expenses Intensity 11.97 9.11 8.30 9.06 27.24 
OC Intensity 92.58 96.30 98.53 97.44 76.67 
R&D Intensity 2.78 4.95 8.47 11.59 12.97 
All cells reflect percentage points (pp) of cost intensities across listing cohorts. Following the procedure of 
Srivastava (2014), all intensities are first computed on a wave-year basis. This method results in 45 observa-
tions for the seasoned firms (1970-2014), 40 annual observations for the 1970s wave (1970-2014), 35 for the 
1980s wave (1980-2014), 25 for the 1990s wave (1990-2014) and 15 for the 2000s wave (2000-2014). The 
overall average intensity of a listing cohort is computed by the mean of all annual intensities. 
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Table 5 
Cost stickiness by cost category and listing cohort 
Panel A: ABcoefficient 
 Seasoned 
Firms 
1970s 
Wave 
1980s 
Wave 
1990s 
Wave 
2000s 
Wave 
SGA 0.447 ∗∗∗ 
(11.20) 
0.502 ∗∗∗ 
(12.74) 
-0.535 ∗∗∗ 
(24.29) 
-0.590 ∗∗∗ 
(34.64) 
-0.487 ∗∗∗ 
(16.77) 
COGS 0.967 ∗∗∗ 
(42.00) 
0.899 ∗∗∗ 
(26.48) 
-0.874 ∗∗∗ 
(43.27) 
-0.875 ∗∗∗ 
(55.92) 
-0.863 ∗∗∗ 
(32.83) 
Core Expenses 0.853 ∗∗∗ 
(37.07) 
0.834 ∗∗∗ 
(36.00) 
0.812 ∗∗∗ 
(46.97) 
-0.832 ∗∗∗ 
(67.49) 
-0.817 ∗∗∗ 
(37.62) 
Noncore Expenses 1.108 ∗∗∗ 
(10.65) 
0.680 ∗∗∗ 
(4.52) 
0.914 ∗∗∗ 
(16.81) 
 0.866 ∗∗∗ 
(20.20) 
-0.824 ∗∗∗ 
(11.44) 
OC 0.911 ∗∗∗ 
(45.57) 
0.882 ∗∗∗ 
(43.66) 
0.839 ∗∗∗ 
(60.62) 
 0.860 ∗∗∗ 
(76.62) 
0.874 ∗∗∗ 
(41.08) 
Panel B: ADcoefficient 
SGA -0.054  
(-0.91) 
-0.158 ∗∗ 
(-2.43) 
-0.283 ∗∗∗  
(-6.62) 
-0.382 ∗∗∗  
(-10.75) 
-0.255 ∗∗∗  
(-3.88) 
COGS 0.147 ∗∗∗ 
(4.51) 
0.042 
(0.78) 
0.015 
(0.35) 
0.044  
(1.29) 
-0.119 ∗∗  
(-1.97) 
Core Expenses -0.017  
(-0.48) 
-0.118 ∗∗ 
(-2.25) 
-0.189 ∗∗∗  
(-4.62) 
-0.179 ∗∗∗  
(-4.36) 
-0.269 ∗∗∗  
(-4.69) 
Noncore Expenses -0.646 ∗∗∗  
(-3.75) 
0.154 
(0.47) 
-0.270 ∗  
(-1.67) 
-0.523 ∗∗∗  
(-4.50) 
-0.073  
(-0.42) 
OC -0.002  
(-0.06) 
-0.093  
(-1.36) 
-0.197 ∗∗∗  
(-5.75) 
-0.155 ∗∗∗  
(-3.38) 
-0.407 ∗∗∗  
(-6.05) 
Table 5 reports the coefficients  and  for each cost category and listing cohort from our main 
regression model (Model (1)). For the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficients of control varia-
bles. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate two-sided significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Robust 
t-statistics, clustered at the firm-level, are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 6 
Incremental effect of employee intensity on cost stickiness (AE) by cost category and listing co-
hort 
 Seasoned 
Firms 
1970s 
Wave 
1980s 
Wave 
1990s 
Wave 
2000s 
Wave 
SGA -0.027  
(0.85) 
0.003  
(0.16) 
0.018  
(1.27) 
0.037 ∗∗∗  
(2.74) 
-0.032  
(-1.24) 
COGS -0.028 ∗∗∗  
(-3.30) 
-0.023 ∗  
(-1.86) 
-0.012  
(-0.93) 
-0.027  
(-1.27) 
0.023 
(1.08) 
Core Expenses -0.011  
(-1.34) 
0.025  
(1.57) 
0.037 ∗∗  
(2.04) 
0.052 ∗∗∗  
(2.97) 
0.066 ∗∗∗  
(2.83) 
Noncore Expenses -0.062  
(1.41) 
-0.087  
(-0.94) 
-0.099 ∗  
(-1.90) 
-0.011  
(-0.30) 
-0.165 ∗∗∗  
(-2.70) 
OC -0.012 ∗∗  
(-1.95) 
-0.018  
(-1.03) 
0.040 ∗∗∗  
(2.80) 
0.035 ∗  
(1.92) 
0.086 ∗∗∗  
(3.19) 
Table 6 reports the coefficient  on the interaction with employee intensity for each cost category 
and listing cohort from our main regression model (Model (1)). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate two-sided sig-
nificance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics, clustered at the firm-level, 
are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 7 
Basic ABJ cost stickiness model by cost category and listing cohort 
Panel A: ABcoefficient 
 Seasoned 
Firms 
1970s 
Wave 
1980s 
Wave 
1990s 
Wave 
2000s 
Wave 
SGA -0.707 ∗∗∗ 
(65.00) 
-0.634 ∗∗∗ 
(48.55) 
-0.678 ∗∗∗ 
(83.09) 
-0.726 ∗∗∗ 
(109.83) 
-0.640 ∗∗∗ 
(49.09) 
COGS -0.994 ∗∗∗ 
(195.35) 
-0.950 ∗∗∗ 
(93.08) 
-0.948 ∗∗∗ 
(152.12) 
-0.937 ∗∗∗ 
(169.48) 
-0.899 ∗∗∗ 
(80.75) 
Core Expenses -0.950 ∗∗∗ 
(235.96) 
-0.923 ∗∗∗ 
(163.71) 
-0.927 ∗∗∗ 
(194.86) 
-0.924 ∗∗∗ 
(238.70) 
-0.888 ∗∗∗ 
(97.40) 
Noncore Expenses -1.124 ∗∗∗ 
(53.88) 
-0.975 ∗∗∗ 
(30.35) 
-0.890 ∗∗∗ 
(45.15) 
-0.907 ∗∗∗ 
(57.90) 
-0.812 ∗∗∗ 
(25.21) 
OC -0.957 ∗∗∗ 
(301.12) 
-0.929 ∗∗∗ 
(159.81) 
-0.937 ∗∗∗ 
(213.42) 
-0.934 ∗∗∗ 
(279.84) 
-0.916 ∗∗∗ 
(109.30) 
Panel B: ADcoefficient 
SGA -0.145 ∗∗∗  
(-8.67) 
-0.139 ∗∗∗  
(-7.05) 
-0.224 ∗∗∗  
(-14.54) 
-0.266 ∗∗∗  
(-18.92) 
-0.343 ∗∗∗  
(-11.38) 
COGS -0.029 ∗∗∗  
( 3.20) 
-0.005 ∗∗∗  
( 0.29) 
-0.029 ∗∗∗  
(-2.06) 
-0.012 ∗∗∗ 
 (-1.88) 
-0.014 ∗∗∗ 
 (-1.55) 
Core Expenses -0.034 ∗∗∗  
(-4.60) 
-0.066 ∗∗∗  
(-4.59) 
-0.128 ∗∗∗  
(-8.85) 
-0.087 ∗∗∗  
(-7.41) 
-0.153 ∗∗∗  
(-5.19) 
Noncore Expenses -0.381 ∗∗∗  
(-8.09) 
-0.231 ∗∗∗  
(-3.13) 
-0.361 ∗∗∗  
(-7.62) 
-0.368 ∗∗∗  
(-8.00) 
-0.434 ∗∗∗  
(-5.09) 
OC -0.035 ∗∗∗  
(-5.82) 
-0.039 ∗∗∗  
(-2.57) 
-0.099 ∗∗∗  
(-7.82) 
-0.086 ∗∗∗  
(-7.42) 
-0.168 ∗∗∗  
(-6.06) 
Table 7 reports the coefficients  and  for each cost category and listing cohort from the basic 
(sparse) ABJ cost stickiness regression model (i.e., without control variables; Model (2)). Therefore, 
the coefficients presented here can be interpreted as percentage changes corresponding to changes in 
costs and sales. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate two-sided significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respec-
tively. Robust t-statistics, clustered at the firm-level, are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 8  
Extended model with simultaneous controls for year- and industry-variation 
Dependent variable: SGA New Indicator Cohort Trend Variable  
,: ∆ ln 	
 0.881 ∗∗∗ 0.877 ∗∗∗  
(12.38) (12.35)  
,: _ × ∆ ln 	
 -0.227 ∗ -0.219 ∗  
(-1.87) (-1.81)  
,: _ × ∆ ln 	
 × 3
4 -0.097 ∗∗∗ 
(-4.29) 
  
,: 
 × ∆ ln 	
 × ℎ    
 1970  -0.032 
(-1.13) 
 
 1980  -0.099 ∗∗∗ 
(-3.67) 
 
 1990  -0.158 ∗∗∗ 
(-5.41) 
 
 2000  -0.312 ∗∗∗ 
(-6.90) 
 
    
Adj. F 0.479 0.482  
Table 8 presents results of the basic (sparse) cost stickiness model extended by interactions terms (,) with the 
listing cohort indicator (3
4) or the ℎ trend variable (variable description in Appendix A) as well as industry- 
and year-indicators (Model (3)). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate two-sided significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respec-
tively. Robust t-statistics, clustered at the firm-level, are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 9 
Mediation analysis 
Dependent variable: SGA KI ≤  
Median 
KI >  
Median 
TL ≤  
Median 
TL >  
Median 
,: ∆ ln 	
 0.854 ∗∗∗ 0.986 ∗∗∗ 1.605 ∗ 0.845 ∗∗∗ 
(10.51) (6.69) (1.68) (11.39) 
,: _ × ∆ ln 	
 -0.182 -0.444 ∗∗ -1.709 -0.124 
(-1.22) (-2.03) (-1.42) (-0.98) 
,: _ × ∆ ln 	
 × 3
4 -0.067 ∗∗ -0.125 ∗∗∗ -0.069 ∗∗ -0.124 ∗∗∗ 
(-2.20) (-3.91) (-2.27) (-3.48) 
Difference in Three-Way Interac-
tion Terms (,) 
0.058 ∗∗ 
(2.32) 
0.055 
(1.14) 
Adj. F 0.463 0.509 0.471 0.494 
N 75,263 66,639 70,963 70,939 
Table 9 presents results of the mediation analysis. We conduct a subsample analysis employing Model (3) and com-
pare the effect of our listing cohort dummy variable 3
4 on cost asymmetry by running the basic cost stickiness 
model for subsamples with a high knowledge intensity (KI) and temporary labor (TL) (variables are described in 
Appendix B) and low KI and TL (using a median split). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate two-sided significance at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.1 levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics, clustered at the firm-level, are presented in parentheses. 
 
